

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY

MORI C05423676

USAF review
completed

ARMY review completed

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KENNEDY
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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 200353Z DEC 72 VIA CAS CHANNELS (BUNKER)
FROM: GENERAL HAIG SAIGON 0303
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
DECEMBER 20, 1972
HAIG TO 06

JUST COMPLETED LENGTHY MEETING WITH GENERALS WEYAND AND VOGT.
VOGT CONFIRMS THAT HE CAN AND SHOULD CONTINUE WITH INTENSIFIED THREE-DAY
STRIKES. HE RECEIVED THIS MORNING AUTHORIZATION FOR A FULL RANGE OF
ADDITIONAL TARGETS. THESE MORE THAN MEET ANY FLEXIBILITY HE MUST HAVE.
HE, INCIDENTALLY, CONFIRMS THAT THERE WERE NO COMPLAINTS FROM HERE ABOUT
LACK OF FLEXIBILITY IN TARGETING AND THAT CONCERNS, IF ANY, MUST HAVE
COME FROM CINCPAC. WEYAND ALSO CONFIRMED THAT DESPITE WEATHER HE WILL BE
ABLE TO MAINTAIN A HEAVY AND SUBSTANTIAL LEVEL OF PRESSURE AGAINST A VAST
ARRAY OF HIGH VALUED TARGETS IN NORTH VIETNAM FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE
HE IS MOST ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE LORAN SYSTEM HE HAS DEVELOPED WHICH
ENABLES HIM TO UTILIZE F-4'S IN LOW VISIBILITY SITUATIONS. HE IS ALSO
CONFIDENT THAT F 111'S, A-6'S AND B-52'S CAN PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE LEVEL OF
EFFORT THROUGHOUT THE RAINY SEASON.

GENERAL WEYAND IS VERY CONFIDENT OF THE MILITARY OUTLOOK IN SOUTH
VIETNAM FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HIS RATINGS ARE AGAIN ON THE RISE
AND ENEMY UNITS BEING ENCOUNTERED ARE WEAK, ILL TRAINED, AND POORLY

MOTIVATED. THEY ARE, AS A GENERAL RULE, COMING OUT SECOND BEST IN
ALL ENCOUNTERS.

WEYAND STATES THAT HE CAN EFFECT FURTHER DRAWDOWN IN U.S. PERSONNEL
WITHOUT ANY LOSSES IN EFFICIENCY. I TOLD HIM TO FORWARD A PLAN TO WASH-
INGTON OUTLINING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THAT HE COULD CONFIDENTLY
RECOMMEND. WE CAN THEN ASSESS BOTH WHETHER OR NOT TO CONTINUE DRAWDOWN
AND IF SO HOW TO PLAY IT, I.E. FOR MAXIMUM EFFECT ON HANOI, THIEU
OR U.S. DOMESTIC SCENE.

I COVERED STRONGLY WITH WEYAND AND VOGT THE ESSENTIALITY OF
MAINTAINING MAXIMUM DISCIPLINE IN THE PR AREA, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT
TO CIVILIANS, RELOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS, AND MATTERS RELATING TO
PEACE SETTLEMENT OR CEASEFIRE.

I AM SCHEDULED TO SEE THIEU THIS MORNING BETWEEN 11 AND 11:30 PRIOR

TO DEPARTURE FOR VIENTIANE. WHAT HIS POSITION WILL BE IS ANY ONE'S GUESS. I SUSPECT HE WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO PRESERVE HIS FLEXIBILITY BY NOT ENDORSING THE AGREEMENT BUT BY NOT FORCLOSING IT EITHER. I INTEND TO STRESS WITH HIM THE FACT THAT A TREMENDOUS REACTION IS DEVELOPING IN THE UNITED STATES TO THE STALLED PEACE EFFORTS AND THE RESUMPTION OF FULL SCALE BOMBING AGAINST THE NORTH. WHILE THIS IS INITIALLY TARGETED ON THE PRESIDENT AND YOU, I WILL EMPHASIZE TO THIEU THAT IT WILL RAPIDLY SHIFT TO THIEU HIMSELF AS THE OBVIOUS OBSTACLE TO PEACE WITH A RESULTANT CLAMOR FOR A CUT OFF OF U.S. SUPPORT. I WILL STRESS THAT THE ONLY WAY TO DEFLECT THE TREND IS THROUGH POST TRIP PR THEME WHICH STRESSES RENEWED U.S./SAIGON CITY AND WHICH SUGGESTS ABOVE ALL THAT SAIGON IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT SETTLEMENT IF HANOI MEETS REMAINING MINOR REQUIREMENTS AND RETURNS TO SPIRIT OF OCTOBER DISCUSSIONS. I WILL ALSO STRESS HEAVILY YOUR ROLE AND THE NEED TO SHIFT SAIGON PR LINE WITH RESPECT TO IT. I AM NOT CONFIDENT THAT THIEU WILL BE AMENABLE BUT I WILL BE AS TOUGH AS POSSIBLE POINTING OUT THAT FOR BETTER OR WORSE THIS IS IT. THE PRESIDENT WILL NO LONGER TOLERATE CARPING FROM SAIGON AND IF THIEU FORCES HIM TO DO SO, HE WILL IMMEDIATELY SHIFT FROM JOINT STRATEGY TO ONE WHICH SEEKS TO SATISFY U.S. INTERESTS ALONE. I NOTE ANTICIPATED PRESS REACTION IS BEGINNING TO DEVELOP BUT, OF COURSE, ALWAYS FROM THE SOURCES YOU WOULD ANTICIPATE. I HOPE YOU WILL RECOGNIZE THIS FOR WHAT IT IS AND PRESS AHEAD WITH POLICIES WHICH IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS WILL AGAIN PROVE OUR CRITICS TO BE COMPLETELY WRONG.

WARM REGARDS.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

EXCLUDED EYES ONLY